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The Arab Spring on Twitter: Language 
Communities in #egypt and #libya 
Axel Bruns and Tim Highfield  
  
With over 600 million signed-up accounts worldwide, Twitter has become an 
important space for the coverage and discussion of unfolding world events, from 
entertainment and sports to natural disasters and political crises. Especially as 
breaking news emerges, many of the platform’s participants begin to use it as a 
channel for ‘ambient news’ (Hermida, 2010): a space in which the collaborative 
efforts of thousands of contributors who share news links, comment on events, and 
together ‘work the story’ (Bruns & Highfield, 2012) as it unfolds, serve to highlight 
the key issues of the day from the total volume of news coverage. This is an example 
of gatewatching processes (Bruns, 2005) as conducted on a distributed basis by a 
large number of users, each contributing only in possibly very minute, ad hoc ways. 
Such processes are further aided by the operation of topical Twitter hashtags 
that are able to bring together a community of interest around identified themes and 
events and channel the relevant tweets posted by members of that community into a 
unified stream of updates. Used in this way – and it should be noted that hashtags can 
perform other functions than as thematic markers, too – hashtags are able to assist in 
the formation of ad hoc publics on Twitter (Bruns & Burgess, 2011); these ad hoc 
publics, in turn, represent a subset of the larger issue publics (Habermas, 2006) that 
exist in relation to specific issues and events across the overall media ecology and in 
society itself. The ad hoc publics also follow Dahlgren’s (2009) depiction of issue 
publics as temporary assemblages that emerge around a given issue, catalysed in part 
by media coverage but reinforced and maintained by ongoing engagement with the 
issue and other participants within the public. Such publics are dynamic, with their 
lifespan depending on the longevity of the issue at hand and the ongoing contributions 
and interactions between their members; if an issue is resolved or public interest 
declines, then the issue public will dissolve. 
Issue publics may include multiple perspectives, offering different 
interpretations or contexts for specific issues and events; in particular, international 
issues may be discussed in a number of nation- or region-specific issue publics with 
their own interests, and which may also intersect and overlap with one another. The 
different perspectives put forward within issue publics might not necessarily interact 
with one another, though; the single-issue public covering the Arab Spring, for 
example, may in fact be a number of different publics with their own dynamics and 
lifespans. These publics may still be connected to one another through the presence of 
individuals and organisations acting as focal points or bridges between different 
discussions, yet the patterns of activity within each public may be quite different. 
Such patterns can be studied on social media platforms such as Twitter, as tweeting 
activity and connections between users can be mapped as networks, highlighting the 
presence or absence of sub-clusters or isolated groups, and bridging accounts, within 
a hashtag public. Here, Habermas’s (2006) suggestion of a fragmented mass audience 
in ‘isolated issue publics’ (423) is not necessarily realised – nor entirely problematic. 
Although there are reasons behind the fragmentation beyond an individual’s political 
opinion (including language and region), the development of these mostly-separate 
discussions can have democratic benefits (Kubitschko, 2011). 
Marres (2006), in studying issue networks online, highlights that these 
discussions can be formed through the promotion of, and interaction between, 
opposing perspectives around the same issue. On social media, and particularly when 
studying hashtag publics, these ideas are especially relevant: the hashtag acts as a 
keyword summarising the central issue or a particular theme, but the surrounding 
content of tweets using this marker may vary extensively in tone, ideology, and intent. 
This is especially apparent in politically-oriented hashtags, from ongoing political 
discussions (the long-standing #auspol hashtag for day-to-day coverage of Australian 
politics, for instance, is a highly polarised space, characterised by antagonistic 
comments rather than considered debate) to live responses to media events such as 
election debates and television panel shows, where the central hashtag may also be 
promoted by broadcasters for use in their programming. However, these general 
patterns are not limited to political discussions, and may also be witnessed across 
contexts from crisis communication and collective action to uses of social media as a 
backchannel for entertainment broadcasts. The focal function of the hashtag as a 
collecting mechanism, acting as a central marker for topical information, serves 
organisational purposes – by encouraging widespread use of a single term to denote 
related content – and can also contribute to discussions becoming trending topics with 
increased attention. 
The structure of such issue and ad hoc publics as they are reflected in social 
media spaces such as Twitter is complicated further where the object of interest 
shared by such publics spans multiple national or regional public spheres and crosses 
language, ethnic, religious, or similar identity boundaries. Where this is the case, the 
same hashtag may play host to highly divergent groups of participants, each engaged 
in their own processes of gatewatching and ambient news coverage, and variously 
clashing, interweaving, or cooperating in their efforts to work the unfolding story. 
Necessarily, such processes are observable most often for major events which draw 
the attention of a worldwide audience, and – where sharing the same hashtag space 
becomes unworkable – may lead to a forking of the original hashtag into multiple 
alternatives designed to accommodate different subsets of the overall ad hoc public 
for the event. Alternatively, the different communities of users populating the same 
hashtag may seek to develop a mutually beneficial working relationship (with self-
selecting participants taking it upon themselves to act as bridges between different 
language groups, for example), or the attrition of minority users unable or unwilling 
to engage with the content posted by the majority of contributors may lead to a 
gradual homogenisation of the hashtag community around the traits, interests and 
attitudes shared by the majority group. 
This chapter explores these processes in the context of the Twitter coverage of 
the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Libya during 2011, with particular attention 
on the interactions between Arabic- and English-language participants. We build on a 
computational evaluation of Twitter archives of the #egypt and #libya hashtags, which 
– due to technical limitations to the hashtag system at the time – were adopted by both 
language groups in spite of their English-language names. Hashtags using the two 
countries’ names in Arabic script could not be used effectively at the time. By 
distinguishing between Arabic-, English-, and mixed-language participants in these 
hashtags, we are able to examine the relative prominence of these different language 
groups within the hashtag communities at any one point, and to chart the changing 
balance between the groups as the two countries moved through various stages of 
conflict (from protests through fighting to regime change and its aftermath). Further, 
we also specifically identify the language preferences of the lead user groups in each 
hashtag over time. 
 
Methodology  
The data upon which this chapter is based were gathered using a modified version of 
the open-source tool yourTwapperkeeper (Bruns, 2011), which connects to the 
Application Programming Interface (API) provided by Twitter to facilitate 
programmatic access to public user activity on the platform. yourTwapperkeeper 
(yTK) connects to the streaming API to gather, in close to real time, any tweets which 
match a number of user-defined keywords: in the present case, these keywords were 
‘#egypt’ and ‘#libya’, the two most prominent hashtags used to discuss unfolding 
events in the two countries during 2011. It delivers these tweets and associated 
metadata – such as the name of the originating user, the exact timestamp of the tweet, 
and various other information – in a tabular form which allows further processing 
with a range of computational tools.  
In doing so, yTK is inherently limited by the fundamental features of the 
Twitter API itself: first (and, in terms of research ethics, most importantly), the API 
delivers only public tweets – that is, tweets posted from accounts which are publicly 
visible on the platform and which could be accessed even by non-registered visitors to 
Twitter.com itself who happened to search for a relevant term or viewed the profile 
page of the originating user. The API does not deliver tweets from accounts which 
have been set to ‘private’ (that is, whose tweets are only visible to followers who have 
been explicitly approved as followers by the account owner), nor direct messages 
between users or other non-public, internal Twitter information. 
Additionally, the public API – as opposed to more comprehensive services 
offered by Twitter itself or its approved third-party data resellers – is inherently 
throttled at one per cent of the total current volume of tweets on the global Twitter 
platform: for example, if the global Twitter userbase were posting one million tweets 
per minute at present, the API would provide a maximum of 10,000 tweets per minute 
at the same time, even if global activity around the search terms tracked by yTK was 
higher than that limit (cf. González-Bailón, Wang, & Rivero, 2012; Morstatter, 
Pfeffer, Liu, & Carley, 2013). For the most part, this limitation remains theoretical as 
the total global volume of tweets is usually several orders of magnitude higher than 
the volume of any one current hashtag or keyword; in the case of major world events 
which attract the attention of a substantial subset of the total Twitter userbase, 
however, it is possible for yTK to reach such limits. In the context of the present case, 
such throttling limits may have been triggered for the #egypt and #libya hashtags on 
days which saw major developments (such as the resignation of President Mubarak in 
Egypt, or the killing of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya). It is impossible to determine from 
the yTK data alone whether such limits were reached; we simply note, therefore, that 
the figures reported in this chapter may undercount total hashtag activity on such 
major days. Unfortunately, these limits could be removed only by drawing on the 
services of commercial Twitter data resellers, at costs well beyond the resources 
available to most publicly-funded research projects. 
Finally, the long-term approach to gathering hashtag data which we have 
pursued for this chapter has also meant that a number of gaps exist in the datasets due 
to API and network outages or scheduled server maintenance. The #egypt dataset is 
missing tweets for 31 Jan., 5-7 Feb., 31 Mar., 1 and 2 Apr., 2-4 Aug., 15 Sep., 16 
Oct., and 23, 26, 27, and 29 Nov. 2011; #libya is missing data for 31 Mar., 1 Apr., 15 
Apr., 2-4 Aug., 15 Sep., 16 and 21 Oct., and 26 and 29 Nov. 2011. (Here and 
throughout the chapter, all dates are given in Cairo time.) This means that for #egypt, 
we missed 16 days in over ten months of data collection; for #libya, we missed 11 
days in nine and a half months. Again, such data outages are hardly avoidable for 
projects which gather social media data over lengthy periods of time; while they cause 
gaps in the day-to-day picture of Twitter activity around these events, they do not 
impact significantly on our overall assessment of user participation patterns in the two 
hashtags. 
We captured tweets in the #egypt hashtag from 23 January to 30 November 
2011, and in the #libya hashtag from 16 February to 30 November. In total, this 
resulted in datasets of 7.48 million tweets for #egypt, posted by some 445,000 unique 
contributors, and 5.27 million tweets from 476,000 unique contributors for #libya. 
Notably, therefore, the larger #libya community created a smaller number of tweets, 
indicating the presence of a greater number of less active users for this hashtag. Such 
greater breadth of participation, to the detriment of the depth of repeated engagement, 
is common where a larger number of users engage in the casual retweeting of 
hashtagged messages, for example. We explore this further in the discussion which 
follows. 
For the purposes of analysis, the raw Twitter data were processed over several 
stages. First, we followed the methodology outlined in Bruns and Stieglitz (2012) to 
distinguish between different types of tweet for each message: original tweets (which 
neither @mention nor retweet other users); genuine @replies (which @mention 
another user but are not retweets); and retweets (which @mention another user in the 
process of retweeting their message, using formats such as ‘RT @user …’, ‘MT 
@user …’, ‘via @user …’ or ‘"@user … "’).  
Further, we divided the total base of actively participating users for each 
hashtag into three groups, according to the volume of their contributions to the 
hashtag: we distinguished between the one per cent of most active contributors, 
designating these the lead users in the hashtag public; the next nine per cent of still 
highly engaged users; and the remaining 90 per cent of least active users. This 
follows a common approach to drawing distinctions in online communities which are 
characterised by a power law distribution of activity – described by Anderson (2006) 
as a ‘long tail’ curve: a small number of regular, highly active users contributes the 
vast majority of content, while a large group of far less active users makes only 
occasional, random contributions. In addition to these three groups, we also identify a 
fourth group of purely passive users: this group encompasses those Twitter accounts 
which are @mentioned (in genuine @replies or retweets) in the tweets in our datasets, 
but did not themselves make any direct post to #egypt or #libya. 
Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of the following discussion, we 
developed an approach which enabled us to make an approximate distinction between 
Arabic and English speakers in the dataset. Due to the complexities inherent in 
accurately identifying different languages, especially in the very short message format 
of individual tweets, through automated computational means, we based this 
distinction instead on the character sets used in each tweet: while English-language 
tweets can usually be expressed in characters that use ASCII codes between zero and 
127, Arabic characters utilise higher-code additions and alternatives to the ASCII 
system. Building in a grace interval of ten high-ASCII characters for nominally 
English-language tweets which contained high-ASCII characters such as curled 
quotation marks, en- and em-dashes, or accented characters, we therefore coded each 
tweet containing fewer than eleven high-ASCII characters as using the Latin alphabet, 
and each tweet with more than ten such characters as using a non-Latin alphabet.  
Given the predominance of English and Arabic as the key languages of 
discussion in #egypt and #libya (which we confirmed through qualitative sampling), 
this Latin/non-Latin distinction serves as a workable approximation of the 
English/Arabic distinction especially once the coding of each tweet is aggregated over 
the large datasets upon which this study is based. We acknowledge that the ‘Latin’ 
tweets will also contain content in various other European languages, while the ‘non-
Latin’ tweets will contain tweets in Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Cyrillic, Farsi, and 
other characters; however, these false positives are well outweighed by the dominant 
languages, and will eventually emerge as outliers in the network maps which we 
present in a later section of this chapter. For the purposes of the present analysis, the 
Latin/non-Latin shortcut is not only sufficient, but also necessary in order to process 
these very large Twitter datasets without having to rely on techniques that sample the 
total dataset down to a much smaller, manually codeable size. 
From the coding of individual tweets as ‘Latin’ or ‘non-Latin’, then, it 
becomes possible to calculate the language profile of each active participant in the 
hashtag public. Here, we introduce a threefold distinction: users for whom at least two 
thirds of their tweets were coded as ‘Latin’ are designated as English-language users; 
users for whom at least two thirds of their tweets were coded as ‘non-Latin’ are 
considered to be Arabic-language users; and users who do not fall into either one of 
these categories are described as mixed-language users. This distinction enables us to 
examine the relative presence of these three language groups in the overall datasets, 
as well as within the three activity groups (lead users, highly engaged users, least 
active users) and over the timeframes covered by our datasets. By charting the @reply 
and retweet interactions between the participants in each hashtag, we are also able to 
examine the extent to which these language groups communicate with each other. 
Analysis  
The first key aim of this study is to examine how the use of Twitter as a medium for 
the dissemination of information and exchange of opinions in relation to the events of 
the Arab Spring uprisings in the two countries differs when comparing the period of 
immediate tension at the point of regime change and the longer-term aftermath of that 
cataclysmic moment. A working hypothesis in this context is that the replacement of 
the existing regime (through peaceful or violent means) is a transitional moment 
which attracts considerable domestic, regional, and international attention in social 
media spaces, while the lengthy and complicated process of building legitimate new 
governmental and societal structures to replace the old regime is of less interest to an 
international audience and is therefore likely to predominantly attract participants 
who – as citizens or regional neighbours of the affected countries – have a direct stake 
in the process. In other words, while in each phase of the transition Twitter continues 
to function as an ambient news network which provides a steady stream of updates on 
current developments, conventional news values apply: the sudden and dramatic 
moment of regime change will attract a greater and more diverse number of 
participants who together engage in ‘working the story’ on the social media platform 
than the slow and difficult project of national renewal. 
If correct, we expect this hypothesis to manifest in the various patterns of 
Twitter activity which our methods are able to document. For both cases to be 
examined here, therefore, we will distinguish between a phase of immediate regime 
change, and a phase of longer-term transition in the aftermath. For Egypt, we focus on 
the month of February 2011 for the former, and on the period of 15 June to 15 
September 2011 for the latter; for Libya, we compare 16 February to 15 March 2011 
and 1 August to 30 September 2011. Given the long aftermath of the overthrow of the 
established regimes in either country, the latter periods are necessarily chosen 
somewhat arbitrarily, and periods from 2012 or 2013 could provide equally valuable 
points of comparison; however, for such more recent periods it would become 
progressively more difficult to distinguish genuine change in the usage patterns 
related to the two country hashtags from the effects of general growth in the local and 
international Twitter userbase. Additionally, Twitter launched support for Arabic-
script hashtags (as well as for hashtags in other right-to-left languages) in March 2012 
(Phelan, 2012), meaning that the use of the English-language hashtags #egypt and 
#libya for tweets which were otherwise in Arabic has generally declined since then. 
However, we begin our analysis with a general overview of the Twitter 
activity within the two hashtags during 2011. #egypt (Figure 1) shows a sharp spike in 
activity during the early days of the period covered by our dataset, on the day of 
President Mubarak’s resignation; this also corresponds to a substantial influx of 
unique users and a very low percentage of non-Latin tweets on the same day (and in 
the days immediately following). The obvious explanation for this pattern is the 
significant world attention paid to the end of the Mubarak regime, generating 
increased Twitter activity especially also from more casual followers of events in 
Egypt (who may be active during that time predominantly by occasionally retweeting 
news updates and other tweets which happen to contain the #egypt hashtag, but who 
are not otherwise committed to following #egypt on an ongoing basis).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: #egypt, 23 Jan. to 30 Nov. 2011  
The comparatively low percentage of non-Latin (i.e. Arabic) tweets during this early 
phase of the transition in Egypt may appear surprising at first, but is also explained at 
least in part by such world attention and the presence of more casual, predominantly 
retweeting non-Arabic participants. Additionally, during late January and early 
February 2011 a number of alternative hashtags were popular on Twitter especially 
with local Egyptian users, referring for example to the major protests in Tahrir Square 
on 25 January 2011 (#Jan25 or #25Jan) or to other significant memes of the fledgling 
revolution. By contrast, international, non-Arabic users with a more limited 
understanding of local issues were more likely already to use #egypt as their hashtag 
for discussing the protests. 
As 25 January passed and Mubarak resigned, however, #Jan25 and other time- 
or issue-specific hashtags became increasingly inappropriate even for Egyptian-based 
users themselves, and a greater adoption of the generic hashtag #egypt evidently 
began. By early March 2011, more than half of the tweets posted to #egypt per day 
used Arabic script, and from April onwards an average of 75 per cent of #egypt 
tweets were in Arabic. This is a significant reversal of the language balance of the 
early days, and is due both to this greater adoption of #egypt as a common hashtag for 
Arabic-language discussion of the transition and to the declining interest of a non-
Arabic speaking world audience in continuing to discuss the regime change process 
other than on a handful of key days during the remainder of the year. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: #egypt, showing Latin tweets and tweets from the least active users  
This decline in international interest, and the corresponding takeover of the #egypt 
hashtag by a smaller number of highly committed Arabic-speaking users, is 
demonstrated even more clearly in Figure 2. It compares the percentage of tweets 
made each day which we identified as being in English or other languages using the 
Latin alphabet, and the percentage of tweets originating from the group of the least 
active 90 per cent of users (as determined over the entire period covered here, from 
January to November). The two curves follow each other closely, showing a gradual 
exodus both of non-Arabic speakers and of less committed participants in the #egypt 
hashtag after the early, revolutionary months – and thereby suggesting a 
predominance of English speakers amongst these more casual contributors to #egypt. 
The overall patterns exhibited by the #libya dataset are remarkably different 
(see Figure 3). There is a similar initial spike of interest during the early stages of the 
revolution, from the first armed conflicts in mid-February through to the UN’s 
declaration of a no-fly zone on 17 March, followed by a much less active period that 
is punctuated only occasionally by spikes in activity around key dates in the 
subsequent civil war (such as the storming of Gaddafi’s Bab Al-Azizia compound in 
Tripoli or Gaddafi’s death on 20 October). Indeed, the first spike in #libya activity 
well surpasses that observed for #egypt – pointing perhaps to the comparative absence 
of rival hashtags for the Libyan case. However, the balance between Latin and non-
Latin tweets remains relatively stable throughout the period examined here; while – as 
in #egypt – the percentage of Arabic tweets is even lower during the first month of the 
conflict, there is no rapid and decisive rise in contributions from Arabic speakers in 
the subsequent period, but only a small readjustment of the balance to a steady level 
of around 20 per cent non-Latin tweets. After Gaddafi’s death, this steps up again, to 
around 30 per cent. 
 
  
 
Fig. 3: #libya, 16 Feb. to 30 Nov. 2011  
This remarkably low rate of participation by Arabic speakers in the #libya hashtag 
may be explained by a number of factors. First, compared to Egypt there was 
considerably less domestic Internet infrastructure available in Libya which would 
have enabled local users to participate in the Twitter discussion, and during its final 
months the Gaddafi regime took further steps to limit Internet access especially for 
the residents of restive regions in the country. The available domestic userbase of 
social media platforms in Libya was therefore considerably smaller than its Egyptian 
counterpart, and the subset of that userbase who had reliable Internet access was 
smaller still.  
Additionally, Gaddafi’s portrayal as the ‘Mad Dog of the Middle East’ by US 
President Ronald Reagan had positioned him – alongside dictators such as Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq or the Kim dynasty in North Korea – as one of the United States’ 
‘favourite’ enemies, representing the stereotypical third-world despot. Even in spite of 
a comparative rapprochement between his regime and the West during the first 
decade of the 21st century, therefore, a revolution directed at overthrowing Gaddafi 
(and one involving NATO forces imposing a no-fly zone and Western military 
advisers on the ground) was more likely to attract English-speaking Twitter 
commenters who would participate over the long term than one aiming to overthrow 
staunch US ally Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. 
Examining the identified ‘crisis’ and ‘aftermath’ phases for each hashtag, 
then, enables us to examine how the balance between English and Arabic speakers 
evolves over time. Here, we also begin to further utilise the distinction between lead 
users, highly engaged users, and other contributors which we introduced in the 
discussion of our methodology, above: not only is the overall shift in the language 
balance itself of interest, but also the distribution of languages across the three 
contributor groups in each time period. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: #egypt language balance, 1-28 Feb. 2011 and 15 June to 15 Sep. 2011  
Figure 4 compares the language balance between the two key periods chosen for the 
#egypt hashtag, and across the contributor groups. First, it demonstrates again the 
substantial shift in language balance, from an early dominance of English-language 
contributors (with over 75 per cent of users in the first period tweeting mainly in 
English) to a mainly Arabic-speaking hashtag community (with some 60 per cent of 
users tweeting mainly in Arabic). During both periods, only a small percentage of the 
total userbase are genuinely multilingual participants (that is, post more than 33 per 
cent but fewer than 66 per cent of their tweets in Arabic or English). 
If the total participant base in each period is broken down into the three groups 
of lead users (top 1 per cent), highly active users (next 9 per cent), and least active 
users (lowest 90 per cent), according to the volume of tweets they posted during that 
timeframe, it becomes possible to determine the specific language patterns pertaining 
to each of these groups. During the immediate crisis phase in Egypt, it is notable that 
while English-language tweets dominate the hashtag, the lead users are already 
considerably more likely to tweet in Arabic or use a mix of languages – compared to 
the less than 20 per cent of least active users who tweet in Arabic, some one third of 
lead users do so, and nearly half of all lead users tweet in Arabic at least some of the 
time. It is also notable during this period that there is a small but important presence 
of mixed-language users both in the lead user group and amongst the highly active 
users; given the combination of predominantly English- and predominantly Arabic-
language participants in these top contributor groups, such bilingual participants are 
likely to play a crucial rule in facilitating the flow of information across the language 
boundary. 
The situation changes almost completely during the aftermath phase. Across 
the entire community of participating users during this time, some one third of users 
tweet mainly in English; however, these users are mainly found amongst the least 
active user group. English-language participants constitute only some 15 per cent of 
the highly engaged group, and less than 10 per cent of the lead users; in these groups, 
Arabic-language users are dominant. Indeed, as a result of that domination, the role of 
mixed-language users is also diminished: fewer members of that group are now found 
in the lead user group. 
This decrease in the bridging role of the mixed-language users also indicates 
that the level of interaction between the different language groups has declined. If 
during the crisis phase English- and Arabic-language users were more frequently 
collaborating (especially with the help of mixed-language participants) in ‘working 
the story’ of the emerging anti-regime protests, in the aftermath phase we find a 
greater disconnect between the English- and Arabic-language subsets of the overall 
hashtag userbase: two language communities which mainly simply happen to share 
the same hashtag but no longer interact closely. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: #egypt @mention networks, 1-28 Feb. 2011 and 15 June to 15 Sep. 2011  
A visualisation of @mention networks based on the genuine @replies and retweets 
across the #egypt hashtag during both periods also demonstrates this (fig. 5) 1. During 
the early crisis phase, English-language users dominate, as we have seen, but they are 
also well-connected with their Arabic-language counterparts, not least through the 
presence of a smaller but important bridging community of mixed-language  
participants which join the two language groups into one large network. By contrast, 
during the aftermath phase the English-language group is both diminished in overall 
numbers and less closely interconnected with the majority Arabic-language group; the 
latter has contracted to form a more self-centred network with only peripheral links to 
the English speakers (as well as to a number of smaller communities of non-Latin 
character users, potentially including users of languages other than Arabic). 
 
 
                                                        1 Full colour versions of these network graphs can be found online at http://mappingonlinepublics.net/2012/06/23/some-brief-updates-twitter-and-television-arab-spring-symposium/  
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Fig. 6: #egypt @mention networks (aggregate), 1-28 Feb. 2011 and 15 June to 15 
Sep. 2011 
 
A simplified depiction of the @mention networks between the three language groups 
(and non-tweeting, passive accounts which are cited by them), aggregated for each 
group, also shows this (Figure 6). During each phase, predictably, the majority of 
@mention interaction for the respective dominant group is with itself (indicated by a 
horseshoe-shaped self-referential arrow); however, during the immediate crisis phase, 
the then-dominant Latin users also engage to considerable extent with the smaller 
mixed group, and these mixed-language users in turn also engage strongly with the 
non-Latin user group. There is even some significant direct interaction between Latin 
and non-Latin users, indicating that while most of the Arabic-speakers, for example, 
may prefer to tweet predominantly in Arabic, many of them are also able to 
understand and engage with users who only use English in their tweets.  
The reverse is less true, however. During the second, aftermath phase, Arabic 
speakers dominate the #egypt hashtag, continuing to interact with mixed-language 
participants fairly frequently, but their interactions with English speakers (and 
especially the @mentions of Arabic-speaking participants by English speakers) have 
declined considerably. Similarly, the mixed-language group continues to @mention 
English speakers frequently, but the favour is rarely returned. The English-language 
group, it appears, has become isolated within a hashtag populated by Twitter users 
whose language it does not understand. 
Finally, the role of the passive group of @mentioned accounts also shifts. 
What unites English- and Arabic-language users during the aftermath phase, and what 
likely explains the continued presence of both in a hashtag that is divided on language 
lines, is that both groups refer to passive accounts as outside sources which do not 
themselves tweet into the #egypt hashtag, but whose tweets may be marked as 
pertaining to the situation in Egypt as active #egypt participants retweet them. During 
the earlier crisis phase, on the other hand, only the English-language users refer to a 
significant extent to such outside sources – and thereby serve as conduits through 
which such outside information may reach Arabic-language users themselves. This 
points to a shift in the role of outside reporting on the transition: where earlier, locals 
may have been engaged in first-hand information exchange through alternative 
channels while outsiders had to rely on media reporting, now such reporting is readily 
available to all parties. 
Additionally, across both countries and timeframes, some non-participating 
passive accounts may also be shared across all language groups if they represent 
politicians, activists, parties and organisations which are relevant to the unfolding 
conflicts and are mentioned as such by active users (from @UN through 
@BarackObama to @ArabLeagueSec), but which are not themselves participating in 
the hashtag exchange. It is now common practice for Twitter users to refer to well-
known people and institutions by their Twitter handles rather than their full names, 
without an expectation of receiving responses from them; such usage transcends 
language barriers and will lead to a considerable overlap in the passive accounts 
addressed by different language communities. 
The #libya hashtag does not see such dramatic changes across the two periods we 
examine here. As noted above, the English-language group remains dominant in 
#libya throughout 2011, even if the level of its dominance declines slightly: as Figure 
7 demonstrates, more than 80 per cent of all users during the crisis phase tweet 
predominantly in English, while by the aftermath phase that proportion has declined 
to just over two thirds.  
 
 
 
Fig. 7: #libya language balance, 16 Feb. to 15 Mar. 2011 and 1 Aug. to 30 Sep. 2011  
At least during the early crisis phase, this dominance is also stable across the different 
user groups once the total userbase is split according to user activity. There is no 
significant difference between the percentage of English-only users amongst the least 
and most active users; the more active user groups exhibit a somewhat greater level of 
participation from mixed-language users, but (contrary to #egypt) Arabic-only users 
are even less represented amongst the lead users than they are amongst the least active 
user group. This paints a picture of a hashtag community which is very strongly 
dominated by English-language users, then. 
During the second phase, Arabic users gain a stronger presence in all aspects, 
except for the top per cent of users active during this timeframe – indeed, this group 
of lead users is even more predominantly English-speaking than it had been during 
the previous phase. The presence of mixed-language users – both in general, and 
amongst the top user groups – has also declined further. This points to a strongly 
bifurcated userbase, where the majority of the discussion – from the lead users on 
down – is conducted by English speakers, while a smaller group of Arabic speakers is 
generally less active than its non-Arabic counterparts, and is poorly interconnected 
with them. 
A visualisation of @mention networks between #libya participants, in analogy 
to that for #egypt, bears this out (see Figure 8). English speakers dominate 
throughout, but during the earlier, crisis phase, the small community of predominantly 
Arabic-speaking users remains reasonably well-connected to the English-language 
mainstream both directly and with the help of mixed-language users serving to bridge 
the language divide. During the second phase, however, the two communities have 
separated. The community of users tweeting predominantly in Latin characters is 
strongly self-centred, with a smaller cluster of users at some distance (possibly 
indicating the presence of a second language community using Latin characters, such 
as French, German or Spanish), while the smaller group of non-Latin users remains at 
a distance and is only loosely connected through a handful of direct links and mixed-
language users. It is also internally divided, indicating in this case less a further 
subdivision caused by different languages using non-Latin scripts, but a lack of 
cohesion even amongst Arabic-speaking participants in the #libya hashtag. 
 
 
Fig. 8: #libya @mention networks, 16 Feb. to 15 Mar. 2011 and 1 Aug. to 30 Sep. 
2011 
 
Figure 9 further explores this by again showing aggregate networks between the three 
language groups and the group of passive accounts. While here, too, the domination 
of English-language accounts is inescapable, during the first phase some notable 
interaction between the English- and mixed-language users, and even directly 
between English- and Arabic-language users does remain. During the second phase, 
such interactions are increasingly scant: the mixed-language group is much 
diminished in size, and English- and Arabic-language participants hardly engage with 
each other directly any more. During both phases, the attention of English-language 
participants in #libya – where it does not remain within the English-speaking group 
itself – is predominantly directed to the outside, passive sources rather than to either 
of the other language groups, substantially more so than we have observed in the case 
of #egypt. 
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Fig. 9: #libya @mention networks (aggregate), 16 Feb. to 15 Mar. 2011 and 1 Aug. to 
30 Sep. 2011 
 
Again, it is likely that these differences between #egypt and #libya are due in part to 
domestic factors – a lower take-up of social media in general and Twitter in particular, 
poorer overall Internet infrastructure, and more state censorship of Internet traffic in 
Libya compared to Egypt – and in part to broader circumstances – such as Egypt’s 
role as a lynchpin in Middle East power structures and international relations, 
compared to Libya’s status under the Gaddafi regime as a pariah state and long-
standing enemy of the United States. In combination, these factors will have resulted 
in different potentials for the development of a strong domestic social media user 
base, and for sustaining the interest of onlookers from further afield in participating in 
the hashtag discussion. 
Conclusion  
The processes observed here across the #egypt and #libya hashtags show that – in 
spite the superficial similarities between the two hashtags, as part of Twitter’s 
coverage of Arab Spring uprisings in a number of North African and Middle Eastern 
nations – the formation and development of international issue publics around major 
political events can follow some very different paths, and result in vastly different 
constellations of participants. 
In both cases, we observed a rapid early spike in interest by Twitter users as 
rumours and news of protests, unrest, and uprisings spread through the social media 
platform. Given the remaining predominance of English and other European 
languages on Twitter at the time and now, and the continuing role of English as a 
global lingua franca, we saw the predominance of English as the language of 
engagement during these early days, and a brief but substantial influx of more 
casually interested users who were attracted to each hashtag as a locus of significant 
current Twitter activity (and who participated in such activity at least peripherally, 
especially by retweeting already-hashtagged messages), but we also documented the 
similarly rapid dispersal of such comparatively inactive participants, leaving the 
longer-term lead users to contribute the vast majority of tweets to the hashtag. Having 
started as ad hoc publics (Bruns & Burgess, 2011), the hashtags now transformed into 
longer-term vehicles for smaller, longer-term publics to engage and interact. 
Subsequent to these early days of intense interest in the conflicts in both 
nations, in both social media and mainstream media, the two issue publics represented 
by these hashtags diverged markedly in their trajectories. #egypt became a space 
which supported a domestic and regional issue public tracking continuing 
developments in the country’s transition, at the time, towards free and democratic 
elections – an issue public whose interactions were predominantly in Arabic, with a 
smaller number of mainly English-language participants also participating and 
remaining linked loosely but notably to the Arabic mainstream of the community. 
#libya, by contrast, hosted a mainly English-speaking community which discussed 
events in that country’s continuing civil war from the outside and which contained 
few domestic or regional, predominantly Arabic-speaking voices – or where it did, 
such voices remained marginal and disconnected from the English-language centre. If 
domestic and regional issue publics which were concerned with the situation in Libya 
at the time existed, they did so elsewhere – using hashtags other than #libya on 
Twitter, or indeed (and more likely) using channels of communication other than 
social media. 
Even in spite of the limitations of existing tools for the automatic detection 
and analysis of the language and location distribution in large Twitter datasets, and of 
the limited availability of previous studies which provide comparison data from 
different contexts, our findings already serve to demonstrate the changeable (over 
time) and variable (from context to context) nature of hashtag publics and of the 
wider issue publics of which they form part, especially in the context of major 
international events and crises. Our work here has been able to establish only the 
broad patterns of interaction within the Arab Spring Twittersphere; significant further 
development of tools and methodologies for the study of Twitter will be required to 
enable a finder-grained analysis of the dynamics of these issue publics as they 
emerged and developed. Substantial further research is also required to document a 
broader range of such cases and examine the different possible roles which Twitter-
based hashtag publics, in particular, can play in the broader national and international 
public sphere.  
Such work must also take into account the continuing transformation of 
Twitter and other social media platforms themselves, of course, as their userbases 
grow and diversify (or possibly shrink and solidify), as well as the shifting 
technological affordances of these platforms as communication features are added or 
removed and as the devices and networks used to access such social media platforms 
themselves continue to evolve. This is especially important in the context of still-
unfolding processes such as the Arab Spring and its consequences, which have also 
resulted in a considerable change in the communicative opportunities now available to 
citizens of Egypt, Libya, and other countries in the region. 
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